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Deficiencies of the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit in Targeting the LowestIncome Households and in Promoting
Concentrated Poverty and Segregation
Shilesh Muralidhara*

Introduction
Affordable public housing has been an issue at the forefront
of public policy in the United States since the Great Depression
era.
The social, political, and economic benefit of adequate
housing for citizens at all income-levels has long been recognized.
Nevertheless, despite almost seventy years worth of effort to
remedy the dearth of affordable housing, there has been a failure
to achieve Congress's stated goal of housing policy: "a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family."1
The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC), which provides a
tax incentive to private developers for the construction and
rehabilitation of affordable housing, is currently the largest
federal program to fund the production of rental housing for lowincome families in the United States.2 There are questions,
however, regarding the ability of the tax credit to meet the needs
of the lowest-income households and its role in promoting housing
segregation and discrimination. If this is indeed the case, and if
the LIHTC continues to be the primary program for the production
of affordable housing, these are important deficiencies that must
be addressed.

* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; M.Sc. London
School of Economics, B.A. University of Minnesota. I would like to thank my
fiance, Nupur Parikh, for all her help, encouragement, and patience throughout
this process. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of this journal, and
particularly Luke Garrett, for their thoughtful comments, suggestions, and careful
editing. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, H.S. and Ponnamma
Muralidhara, for their unending support.
1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2002) (declaring the goals of U.S. housing
policy).
2. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX CREDITS: OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE

OVERSIGHT

OF

THE

LOW-INCOME

HOUSING

PROGRAM

http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97055.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

1

(1997),
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This Article takes a closer look at the overall effectiveness of
the LIHTC as one of the primary mechanisms to deliver affordable
housing. Part II briefly details the history of affordable housing in
the United States. Part III elaborates on the basic mechanics,
administration, and overall performance of the tax credit since its
original implementation. Part IV looks closely at evidence of the
tax credit's inadequacy in targeting affordable housing to the
lowest-income households.
Part IV also examines the high
concentration of LIHTC projects in central-city areas with high
concentrations of poverty and the role of the LIHTC in
perpetuating segregation. Part V suggests measures that should
be considered to remedy these inadequacies in order to achieve the
aforementioned goal of housing policy. This Article ultimately
concludes the following: (1) the LITHC program, though possibly
adequate in providing affordable housing to moderate-income
households, is failing to target the lowest-income households and
(2) the lack of oversight of the administration of the LIHTC may
be leading to discrimination in housing practices, the perpetuation
of segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the
placement of LIHTC units in areas of concentrated poverty.
I. History of Affordable Housing
The recognition of the shortage of affordable housing and the
first attempts by the government to deal with the problem came in
the form of the United States Housing Act of 1937.3 This law
focused on the plight of the heavily unemployed working class and
proposed to correct the "acute shortage of decent, safe, and
sanitary dwellings for families of low income."4 The government's
first foray into development of affordable public housing was
designed primarily to create jobs for unemployed building-trade
workers during the Great Depression and to provide housing for
the hard-working, "deserving," poor married couples going through
temporary economic strife.5 The focus of housing policy shifted in
the post-World War II era with the Housing Act of 1949,6 which
gave priority to the very poor and those displaced by urban

3. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
4. § 1, 50 Stat. at 888.
5. See LANCE FREEMAN, THE BROOKINGS INST., SITING AFFORDABLE HOUSING:
LOCATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD TRENDS OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT

DEVELOPMENTS
IN
THE
1990S
2
(2004),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/publications/20O40405-freeman.htm.
6. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413, 430 (1949) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (repealed 1990))..
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renewal.7
This era also witnessed the second wave of mass
migration of Blacks from the South to the cities of the North and
West. 8 Many cities used public housing as a means to house Black
migrants barred from White neighborhoods, and by the middle of
the century, public housing served increasingly poor minority
individuals and families.9 Regardless of the population that lowincome housing policy intended to target, from its inception
through the peak of construction in the late 1960s and early
1970s, 10 the dominant trend in its implementation was the
construction of public housing.1 1
In 1973, as the problems of public housing became politically
salient, President Nixon issued a moratorium on federally
subsidized public housing programs. 12 From 1974 through the
early 1980s the primary low-income housing program was the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Projectbased Section 8, through which HUD provided assistance to public
housing authorities and private owners for twenty to forty years
after construction or substantial rehabilitation of low-income
rental units. 13 During its tenure, Project-based Section 8 produced
approximately
750,000 new
and substantially renovated
14
subsidized housing units-an average of about 83,000 per year.
In the mid-1980s, Congress virtually replaced direct
subsidies for low-income housing with a housing tax credit. The
LIHTC program was created by the Tax Reform Act of 198615 as a
temporary "stop-gap" measure with the withdrawal of federal
7. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. BARRY G. JACOBS ET AL., GUIDE TO FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 20-21 (2d
ed. 1986).
11. See JILL KHADDURI ET AL., ABT AsSOC., TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION
SUBSIDIES: LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2003) [hereinafter ABT LITERATURE REVIEW].

The construction of public housing is a supply-side or production program under
which the federal government pays for the initial and ongoing capital costs of the
development of housing and residents generally pay 30% of their income for rent.
As of 2003 there were still around 1.2 million occupied public housing units, most of
which were built from the 1950s to the early 1980s. Id.
12. See Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and the Contribution,
in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 335, 341 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).

Subsequently, construction of public housing declined dramatically and only those
projects in progress prior to the moratorium were completed. Id.
AND

13. NAT'L LOW-INCOME HOUSING COAL., 2005 ADVOCATES GUIDE TO HOUSING
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
(2005),
http://www.nlihc.org/

advocates/index.htm.
14. Kevin M. Cremin, The Transition to Section 8 Housing: Will the Elderly Be
Left Behind?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 405, 409 n.23 (2000).
15. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
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support for other subsidized affordable housing programs and tax
incentives under earlier laws. 16 Congress removed or reduced the
benefits of various open-ended real estate investments such as
Project-based Section 8, replacing them with "a fixed dollar
amount of tax benefits for investors in income-targeted
developments, with state agencies allocating the amount of the per
capita credit for the state."17 The program was subsequently
modified several times1 8 before being made permanent with the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.19
The LIHTC was created as an incentive to private developers
to construct new housing and rehabilitate dilapidated affordable
housing by allowing owners of qualified rental properties to
receive a tax credit over a period of ten years.20 The tax credit's
primary purpose was to increase the supply of affordable housing.
Although one of the explicit criteria for allocation of the credit was
to target the lowest-income households, nothing in the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC)21 required that this criterion be met.22 While
Congress recognized the need to continue some form of federal
housing assistance, a key intention of the LIHTC was to reduce
the overall cost to the federal government for the development and
maintenance of housing through the allocation of a tax credit
rather than direct government subsidy.
According to the General Accounting Office, the LIHTC is
currently "the largest federal program for funding the
development and rehabilitation of rental housing for low-income
households." 23 The tax credit is administered by the Department

16. See Janet Stearns, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Poor Solution to
the Housing Crisis, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 203, 208-12 (1988). The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 eliminated favorable tax treatment for the construction of rental housing
such as special accelerated depreciation. Id. at 208.
17. Jim Solem, Affordable Housing Issues 10 (October 2001) (unpublished and
on file with author).
18. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 1002(1), 102 Stat. 3373, 3373-382; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7108, 103 Stat. 2306, 2306-322; Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 1170, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-505,
507; Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 107, 105 Stat. 1687.
19. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
Stat. 312.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 42(f)(1) (2002).
21. The LIHTC is laid out in 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2002).
22. See generally id.
23. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; see also ABT ASsoc., DEVELOPMENT AND
ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT DATABASE 1-2

(1996), available at http://www.abtassoc.com/reports.D19960024.pdf
ABT REPORT 1996].

[hereinafter
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of Treasury through state and local agencies. Through 1994,
approximately 700,000 units were placed in service. 2 4 Another
500,000 units were constructed between 1994 and 2002,25 and
currently the LIHTC accounts for between 60,000 to 80,000 units
26
of new affordable housing each year.
Since its inception, the LIHTC has garnered increased
attention as private developers have become familiar with the
complexities of the tax credit and better at gauging the risks and
return on their investments. 27 The program, by bringing together
state housing agencies, private and non-profit developers, and the
IRS (for monitoring and compliance), "is designed to bring the
efficiency and discipline of the private market to the building of
affordable rental housing."28 Though the LIHTC program may not
be well-designed to reach the lowest-income households, it is
effectively the only federal housing production program.
II. The Basics of the LIHTC
A. Mechanics of the LIHTC
The LIHTC program, now more than 15 years old, has
become the nation's primary mechanism to encourage the
production of housing for low- or moderate-income households.
The program represents a partnership between the federal, local,
and state governments on one side and the local private sector on
the other, and demonstrates the increased reliance on the private
29
sector to supply affordable housing.

24. Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing & the Role of the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit Program:A Contemporary Assessment, 57 TAx LAW. 869, 870 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Id. Though the number of projects has remained fairly constant over the
last few years, the number of units has grown from approximately 56,000 units
annually between 1992 and 1994 to more than 90,000 units between 1995 and
2002, reflecting a boost in the size of the average LIHTC project from 42.1 units in
the earlier period to 77.7 units in 2002. ABT ASSOC., UPDATING THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT (LIHTC) DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED IN SERVICE THROUGH

2002
18
(2004),
available
http://www.abtassociates.com/rports/2003630111505-16197.pdf
[hereinafter

at
ABT

REPORT 2002].
27. See RECAPITALIZATION ADVISORS, INC., THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: A PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES 3-6

(2002),

http://www.recapadvisors.com/pdf/report1.pdf

[hereinafter

RECAPITALIZATION REPORT].

28. Jean L. Cummings & Denise DiPasquale, The Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit: An Analysis of the First Ten Years, 10 HOUS. POLICY DEBATE 251, 252
(1999).
29. Leviner, supra note 24, at 871.
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In order to receive the LIHTC, a property owner must
generate enough funds to produce affordable housing and then
sustain the housing over the period of the tax credit.30 A property
owner with the ability to generate the required capital may receive
the LIHTC over a period of ten years as long as the property
remains a rental unit and meets certain income and rent
restrictions for a minimum of fifteen years.31 This last stipulation
has recently been amended to a thirty-year extended agreement
with certain contingencies permitting conversion to a market rate
32
rental unit at an earlier date.
To receive the LIHTC, a property owner is required to set
aside a specific proportion of units for lower-income tenants. The
owner of an LIHTC rental property must elect to allocate either
20% of the units to households with income less than 50% of the
area median income, or 40% of the rental units to households with
33
income less than 60% of the area median income.
Under the LIHTC program the qualified property owner may
claim tax credits over a period of ten years for 30% to 70% of the4
present value of new and substantially rehabilitated housing
The percentage of the credit actually received by the owner of the
property depends on whether the LIHTC project uses other
sources of federal subsidies. 35 The 30% present value tax credit is
used when other federal financing is used for rehabilitation or new
construction. 36 The 70% present value credit is available to the

30. Id.
31. Id. at 873 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 42(g)(2), (h)(6) & (i)(1) (2002)).
32. Id. citing 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(D) (2002)). The requirement that the
property meet these restrictions for thirty years can be terminated prior to the end
of the thirty-year period either on the date the property is acquired in a foreclosure,
or one year after the owner gives written notice to the allocating agency that it
intends to dispose of the property. 26 U.S.C. §§ 42(h)(6)(D), (E) & (1) (2002).
Written notice can be given at any point after the end of the fourteenth year of the
agreement. 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(I) (2002). The allocating agency may avoid
termination by finding a buyer for the property. Id. However, for three years
following conversion, no existing low-income resident can be evicted other than for
good cause and there can be no increase in gross rent above the rent allowable in
the absence of termination. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 42(h)(6)(E)(i) & (ii) (2002).
33. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 42(g)(1)(A) & (B) (2002).
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(b) (2002). An existing property previously operated as
an affordable property may qualify for the LIHTC if the property was acquired by
purchase, did not receive the tax credit under the prior owner or a related party,
and if there was no change in ownership or major improvements to the property in
the last ten years. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(d) (2002).
35. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 105T CONG., PRESENT
LAW AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT 2-3 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
36. ABT REPORT 2002, supra note 26, at 14.
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developer
of
non-federally
financed
rehabilitation
or
construction.3 7 An additional incentive, passed by Congress in
1989, awards a higher credit amount to a property built in a
qualified census tract or a difficult development area.38
A
qualified census tract is defined as an area in which 50% or more
of all households have an income lower than 60% of the area's
median gross income. 39 Difficult development areas are those
designated by HUD as areas with high construction, land, and
utility costs relative to area median income.40 The higher amount
is achieved by increasing the property's eligible basis from which
the tax credit is calculated to 130% of its original eligible basis.41
LIHTC units allocated to these lower-income households are
rent-restricted.
To continue receiving the credit, the rental
property owner cannot charge rents that exceed 30% of the
imputed income limitations chosen for those units, meaning 50%
or 60% of the area's median gross income.4 2 It is important to note
that rents are based on metropolitan household income and
expense criteria, but not the income of the actual tenant renting
the property. 43 Thus, "the program does not guarantee that an
individual tenant household will not have to pay more than 30% of
its income for rent, only that the rent will be held down to a level
considered affordable by standards within the metropolitan
44
area."

37. Id.
38. Thomas R. Wechter & Daniel L. Kraus, The Internal Revenue Code's
Housing Program:Section 42, 44 TAx LAw. 375, 392 (1991).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(ii) (2002).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(iii) (2002).
41. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(i)() (2002). For a new property built in either a
qualified census tract or a difficult development area, the higher credit amount is
130% of total eligible basis. Id. For a rehabilitated property, the higher credit
amount is 130% of total expenditures on the property. See 26 U.S.C. §
42(d)(5)(C)(i)(II) (2002).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(2) (2002); GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 25. The
maximum rent limitation ensures that rent-restricted units remain affordable for
low-income households. The rent includes utilities but excludes other sources of
demand subsidies that may be available to the renter household such as payment
made under the Section 8 housing vouchers program. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(2)
(2002).
43. Kirk McClure, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit as an Aid to Housing
Finance: How Well Has It Worked?, 11 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 91, 93 (2000). The
actual rents for LIHTC units are determined by affordability standards in each
metropolitan area and are based on what a family could afford if it paid 30% of its
income for housing. Id.
44. Id.

360
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B. Administering the LIHTC
Although the LIHTC program is subsidized entirely by the
Department of Treasury, it is generally administered by the state
housing finance agency through a competitive process.4 5 States
are authorized by the federal government to issue tax credits to
qualified taxpayers for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or new
46
construction of affordable rental housing.
The administration of the tax credit is deeply intertwined
with state and local government action. The quantity of the credit
available to a given state each year is determined by multiplying
the state's population by $1.75. 47 The credit is then allocated
pursuant to a qualified allocation plan (QAP) created by the state
government's designated agency-usually the state housing credit
agency. 48 The QAP is federally mandated and used to explain the
basis upon which the housing agencies distribute their tax
credits. 49 Based on their QAP, states establish preferences and
set-asides within their tax credit competitions so as to target the
credits toward specific regions, such as rural areas, or specific
populations.50 The allocating agency's QAP details the criteria
determining which projects are selected and how credits will be
distributed by addressing issues, such as large pockets of poverty,
and targeting inner-city areas.5 1 Each state's QAP for the LIHTC
45. Id. at 92-94.
46. ABT REPORT 2002, supra note 26, at 1.
47. 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(3)(C)(ii)(I) (2002). Annual adjustments for inflation began
in 2003. Id.
48. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(i) (2002).
49. JEREMY GUSTAFSON & J. CHRISTOPHER WALKER, ANALYSIS OF STATE
QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLANS FOR THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM 1 (2002).
50. Previous research demonstrated that the flexibility of the LIHTC program
allows states to pursue a wide variety of housing policies and goals. "In Los
Angeles, for example, state administration of the tax credit has favored single-room
occupancy (SRO) projects which often serve as transitional housing for the
homeless; 50 percent of the LIHTC units in the Los Angeles are efficiencies
(compared with 16 percent efficiencies for the city's overall rental stock...)."
Cummings & DiPasquale,.supra note 28, at 272. In other cities, the emphasis has
been placed on family housing. For example, "in Cincinnati, 58 percent of LIHTC
units have three bedrooms or more (compared with 17 percent of the metropolitan
area's rental housing stock). In metropolitan Philadelphia, 42 percent of the
LIHTC units have three or more bedrooms, compared with 22 percent in the rental
stock." Id.
51. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 5-6. Specifically, the IRC
specifies that criteria for selection of the projects are to include:
project location (e.g. broad geographic distribution, designated targeted
areas such as inner cities ... pockets of poverty, and rural areas), housing
needs characteristics (e.g. low vacancy rate, income mix of tenants within
the project), project characteristics (e.g. whether the project increases the
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must then be reviewed as part of a state's consolidated plan
submitted to HUD that involves all Section 8 housing and public
52
housing that receive federal funds.
The tax credit statute explicitly requires that each state's
QAP must give preference to "projects serving the lowest income
tenants ... for the longest period of time." 53 It further requires a
QAP to specify a procedure for monitoring compliance with the
statute and notifying the IRS in cases of non-compliance. 4 The
LIHTC states that the amount of the credit allocated to selected
properties must not exceed the amount that the state agency
deems necessary to ensure viability of the project and a fair return
to investors.55 Finally, the LIHTC requires the state agency to
allocate at least 10% of the credit to properties in which non-profit
entities own an interest or substantially participate in the
56
development of the property.
If a property that receives the tax credit fails to meet the
minimum requirements mentioned above, ceases to qualify as lowincome rental housing, or is disposed of before the end of the
fifteen- or thirty-year compliance period, a portion of the credit
with interest for all years prior to breaking compliance may be
recaptured.5 7 In order to ensure compliance with the Treasury
Department's regulation, the IRC contains reporting requirements
for both state agencies and owners of the project developments
receiving the tax credit. Each state agency is required to submit
to the Treasury Department an annual report specifying the
amount of the credit allocated to it,
the buildings and developers
receiving the credit, and any other information "as the Secretary
[of Treasury] may require."58 In addition, development owners
must certify that they meet the LIHTC requirements and must
provide other information mandated by the Treasury
Department.5 9 Due to the confidentiality of tax-related matters,
however, little information regarding households occupying

stock of low-income housing, whether substantial rehabilitation
expenditures are needed by the project, energy conservation, quality of
units, and type of financing)... [.]
Id. at 14-15; see U.S.C. § 42(m)(1) (2002).
52. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 55-56.
53. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii) (2002).

54. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(iii) (2002).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(2)(A)-(B) (2002).
56. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5) (2002).
57. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(j) (2002).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 42(1)(3)(C) (2002).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 42(1)(1)(E) (2002).
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LIHTC units is required or made available for analysis.60
C. Summary Statistics of the LIHTC Program
The LIHTC has been administered for nearly twenty yearsan adequate duration of time in which to examine the program's
performance in achieving explicit goals, such as increasing the
overall supply of affordable housing, as well as its side effects on
segregation and concentrations of poverty. In order to evaluate
the program, an overview of its overall performance is necessary.
LIHTC implemented its tax credit program in 1987.1 Since
the program began, it has operated on an annual budget of
approximately $5 billion and has provided much of the support for
62
producing new and rehabilitated low-income rental housing.
Between 1995 and 2002, approximately 1,300 projects and 90,000
units were placed into service each year. 63 Of all the units
produced by developers receiving the tax credit, the vast majority
were LIHTC qualifying units, meaning units for low-income use
64
with restricted rents for which the tax credit could be claimed.
Approximately two-thirds of all new units were newly constructed,
65
while the remaining units were rehabilitated structures.
Although the program requires only 10% of all projects to be
allocated to non-profit sponsors, approximately 30% of projects
have been initiated by non-profits since 1987.66
Of all LIHTC projects awarded between 1995 and 2002, just
under half were located in central-city areas, approximately 38%
were located in metro region suburban areas, and 13% were
located in non-metro areas.67 LIHTC units are more often built in
areas of concentrated poverty, defined as areas where over 30% of
people are below the poverty line.68 While 12.3% of rental units
nationally are built in areas of concentrated poverty, 18.8% of all
60. See COMMITTEE REPORT supra note 35, at 5-6. See also Leviner supra note
24, at 882 (discussing the Code and the Treasury's lack of enforcement of their
objective of targeting lowest-income households through the LIHTC).
61. ABT REPORT 2002, supra note 26, at 2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 11-12.
64. Id. at 11. The units qualifying for the tax credit in these projects comprised
95.3% of all units.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id.
67. ABT REPORT 2002, supra note 26, at 24, 27. Approximately three-fourths of
all LIHTC projects in metro suburban and non-metro areas are new construction,
while new construction accounts for less than one-half of the central-city LIHTC
projects. Id. at 27.
68. Id. at 36.
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LIHTC units are built in such areas.69 This pattern is accentuated
in central cities, where approximately 32% of all LIHTC units are
in areas of concentrated poverty, while only one-fifth (20.8%) of
central-city rental units nationwide are located in areas of
concentrated poverty. 70 The percentage of rental units constructed
in areas of concentrated poverty is much lower in suburban
areas. 71 Only 5.2% of LIHTC units in suburban areas are located
in high-poverty areas compared to 3.5% of rental units
nationwide .72
The percentage of LIHTC units built in areas of highminority concentration 73 between 1995 and 2002 is also greater in
central-city areas than in suburban areas. Approximately 58.4%
of all LIHTC units are built in areas of high-minority
concentration as compared to 28.4% of LIHTC units in suburban
74
areas and 14.6% in non-metro areas.
III. The Effectiveness of the LIHTC in Targeting LowestIncome Households and the Promotion of Concentrated
Poverty and Segregation
A. Reaching the Lowest-Income Households
While administration of the LIHTC through state housing
agencies appears to be targeting units in areas with
concentrations of poor households, recent empirical research
points out that the program is generally producing units with
rents that only moderate-income households can afford. Thus, the
program may be serving only families with the highest incomes in
the eligible population while failing to reach households most in
need of assistance. If this is true, and if the LIHTC continues to
be the de facto program for the production of affordable housing,
the inability of the tax credit to reach the lowest income familieswhether by design or as an inadvertent result of the program's
structure-is an important deficiency that must be addressed.
The LIHTC is subject to budget constraints, as are all other

69. Id.
70. Id. "In addition, 7.1 percent of tax credit units are located in tracts where
more than 40 percent of the people are poor (compared to 3.1 percent of households
and 5.6 percent of rental units nationally)." Id. at 32.
71. ABT REPORT 2002, supra note 26, at 36.
72. Id.
73. High-minority concentration is defined as greater than 50% minority. Id. at
37.
74. Id. at 33.
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federal housing programs. This means that the tax credit is
available for only a limited number of properties. 75 Therefore,
limitations are placed on investors in low-income housing to
ensure they do not profit solely because they were fortunate
enough to be awarded the credit.76 The LIHTC creates a system of
regulations and constraints-the most important being the
limitations on the tenant's income and the rents property owners
can charge on tax-credit qualifying units.77 Unfortunately, as
discussed below, these limitations are the main reason that
owners of LIHTC units fail to rent to the lowest-income families.
Although the LIHTC, as laid out in the IRC, explicitly states
that one of the program's objectives (to be carried out through
state housing agencies' allocation of the tax credit) is targeting the
lowest-income households, 78 neither the IRC nor the Treasury
Department penalizes investors for failing to do so. 79 Rather, the
LIHTC regulations seem to achieve the opposite result by failing
to require that owners of qualified property rent to households
with incomes substantially below the income limits of the area
median income.8 0
Since the owners of the qualified rental
properties can generate the greatest revenues by renting to
households with the largest incomes while still complying with the
LIHTC guidelines, there is little motivation to offer units for rent
to poorer households whose income fall below the lower limits of
the guideline set by the program.81 As illustrated in numerous
empirical studies cited below, this results in rents that are beyond
the means of many poor households.
One comprehensive study of the LIHTC conducted by the
National Council of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA) in 1997
concluded that unless LIHTC occupants are receiving additional
subsidies, their household incomes are generally between 40% and
60% of the median national income.8 2 Another study similarly
concluded that owners of LIHTC properties receiving no other
federal subsidies charged rents that are affordable to households

75. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 14-15.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
Leviner, supra note 24, at 882.
Id.
Id.

82. E & Y KENNETH LEVENTHAL REAL ESTATE GROUP, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: FIRST DECADE
7 (1997). According to the report, tenants without rental subsidies (69% of the

sample) had an average yearly income of 45% of the national median income.
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8 3
between 45% and 60% of the area median income
A 1999 study conducted by Cummings and DiPasquale of
over 120,000 LIHTC units in nineteen metropolitan areas found
4
the median rent charged to households to be approximately $436.§
Working under the assumption that the property owner was
charging a rent equal to 30% of the household's income, the income
of the household paying the median rent in their sample was
$17,440. This income level was approximately 48% of the national
median household income of $37,216.85 Although well within the
income limitation which owners of LIHTC units are required to
follow,8 6 it illustrates that in the absence of additional subsidies
the median rents charged for tax credit units are affordable only to
households with incomes just below the upper limit of the
mandatory guidelines. Cummings and DiPasquale emphasize this
lack of affordability by examining the bottom one percentile of the
unit rent distribution in their sample, with a rent of $203 per
month.8 7 Even though this rent is well within the maximum
allowed by the LIHTC program, they point out that approximately
36% of the nation's renter households in 1990 would not have been
able to afford that rent.8 8 This indicates that a significant portion
of the nation's low-income households are incapable of affording
units produced by the nation's de facto affordable housing
program.
The Cummings and DiPasquale study also points out that the
measure for the area median income used in the LIHTC program
may lead to rent limits which are too high for the lowest-income
households.8 9 The LIHTC program is dependent on the federal
definition of the applicable area median income for setting rent
and income limits, using the Section 8 HUD adjusted median
family income (HAMFI).90 This measure reflects incomes of all
households in the area, both renters and homeowners, and fails to
consider that average income for renters is considerably lower
than for homeowners. 9 1 While the median income for renter
households nationwide was approximately $31,000 (in 1996

83. RECAPITALIZATION REPORT, supra note 27, at 26.
84. Cummings and DiPasquale, supra note 28, at 274. All calculations in the
study were done in 1996 dollars.
85. Id.
86. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(1)(A) & (B) (2002).
87. Cummings and DiPasquale, supra note 28, at 279-80.
88. Id. at 280.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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dollars), the nationwide HAMFI for a four-person household was
approximately $41,600 (in 1996 dollars), or 135% of the actual
renter median income. 92 Basing income limits on the income
distribution of all households rather than on renter households
pushes the LIHTC program toward higher-income renters.
It is also possible that the income limitation may lead to the
tax credit serving households that are not truly in financial need.
This flaw stems from the program's use of area median income
rather than national median income to determine the qualifying
income limitations. 93 Through the use of area median incomes, the
owners of properties in relatively wealthy areas may be eligible for
the tax credit while renting units to households with income at or
above the national median income. 94 Cohen illustrates this in his
1998 study by pointing out that though the national median
income was roughly $37,000, the median family income for a
family living in Marin County, California was over $59,000. 95 This
meant that owners of properties in Matin could receive the tax
credit if they were to rent 40% of their units to households whose
income was 60% of the area median income, or approximately
$35,500, an income level approaching the national median
income. 96 Thus, properties built in relatively affluent areas may
qualify for the LIHTC even though they provide housing to
relatively well-off households rather than to truly low-income
households.
B. DiscriminatoryImpact and Concentrationsof Poverty
Since the inception of federally subsidized housing, each
federal housing program has been criticized for fostering both
racial segregation and greater concentrations of the poor in lowincome neighborhoods. 97 The Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968
(FHA)98 was drafted in response to state government housing
agencies that resisted promoting integration by building lowincome housing in poor, segregated neighborhoodsP 9 The Act gave
92. Id.
93. Leviner, supra note 24, at 882.
94. David P. Cohen, Improving the Supply Side of Affordable Housing: The Role
of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 537, 556-57 (1998).
95. Id. at 556.
96. Id.
97. See generally Michelle Adams, Separate and [Un]equal: Housing Choice,
Mobility, and Equalizationin the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL.
L. REV. 413, 434-37 (1998) (critiquing earlier federal housing programs).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2002).
99. Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization:Applying
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an explicit mandate to these agencies to "affirmatively further"
fair housing through the promotion of non-discrimination and
desegregation practices. 100
While housing policy continues to place importance on these
practices, 10 1 recent scholarship highlights the difficulty in
reconciling the LIHTC program's preference for construction of
units in the most impoverished areas, i.e. qualified census tracts,
with the duties of fair housing.10 2 This preference becomes even
more difficult to justify since many scholars and policy experts
advocate mixed-income housing as a central objective of housing
policy. 10 3 The argument is that just as living in a poor community
"can have negative effects on the life chances of the children in
low-income households, living among households with relatively
04
higher incomes can create benefits for low-income children."'
In contrast to previous federal housing policy, the
administration of the LIHTC does not require the collection of
racial data on the placement of LIHTC units. 10 5 This is consistent
with the Treasury Department's general lack of information
regarding implementation of the tax credit. Although state

the FairHousing Act to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L.R. 1747,
1750 (2005).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e)(5) (2002). According to Orfield, "[tihis duty to
affirmatively further fair housing was interpreted by the courts... to require the
federal government... to support racial integration and to prohibit.., the federal
government and its grantees from developing low-income housing projects in areas
where minority and low-income residents were concentrated." Orfield, supra note
99, at 1750.
101. See, e.g,. Terry A.C. Gray, De-ConcentratingPoverty and PromotingMixedIncome Communities in Public Housing: The Quality Housing and Work
ResponsibilityAct of 1998, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 173 (1999).
102. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit Programand the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011,
1012-13 (1998).
103. See JILL KHADDURI ET AL., LIHTC AND MIXED INCOME HOUSING: ENABLING
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN TO LIVE IN LOW POVERTY NEIGHBORHOODS? 1 (2004),
available at http://www.appam.org/conferences/fall/atlanta2004/sessions/downloads
/3401.pdf.
104. Id. Khadduri further notes that "tihe mechanisms through which this
comes about-for example, adult role models, reduction of negative peer influences,
networks that lead to jobs and services, or low levels of crime and violence--[sic] are
not well understood and continue to be the subject of intensive study." Id. at 1 n.1.
The characteristics of city or suburban communities can have profound impact on
the opportunities for people living there. MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN
METROPOLITICS 28-48 (2001).
105. See Roisman, supra note 102, at 1012-13. However, if the LIHTC units are
mixed with funds from HUD or the Department of Agriculture, racial data must be
collected. Id. at 1038-39. Since 1994, HUD has contracted with Abt Associates,
Inc., to collect data on the number and location of units and the characteristics of
the tenants of qualifying units. See ABT REPORT 1996, supra note 23, at 1-4.
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agencies and property owners are required to report to the
Treasury Department on tax credit projects, little information is
actually provided for analysis due to the confidentiality
requirements of tax-related submissions. 10 6
The Treasury
Department, therefore, lacks basic information on the number of
units built each year, and tenant characteristics such as ethnicity,
household size, and income. 0 7 The administration of the LIHTC
program, therefore, lacks substantial information regarding the
extent of discrimination, segregation, and poverty within taxcredit units. 08
Furthermore, the federal and state agencies
responsible for fair housing and for administering the LIHTC
program have not provided specific rules or regulatory guidance to
prevent these conditions. 109 Thus, in addition to the failure of the
LIHTC rent and income limitations to target the tax credit to the
lowest-income households, the opaqueness of the program may
permit landlords the liberty of choosing from the pool of potential
tenants in a manner that is discriminatory or that promotes
segregation in violation of federal housing law." 0
Recent evidence indicates that the LIHTC is promoting
housing riddled with both poverty and segregation. One study by
the NCSHA concluded that one-third of all LIHTC allocations go
toward rehabilitation of inner-city projects for minorities in highpoverty neighborhoods."' Although the distribution of LIHTC
units across central-city, suburban, and non-metropolitan areas is
similar to the distribution of all rental units nationally, 112 LIHTC
units are more likely to be located in areas where more than 60%

106. Id. at 1-5.
107. Id. at 1-2.
108. See Roisman, supra note 102, at 1012-13. Although LIHTC requires each
state's housing agencies to include "selection criteria" in their allocation plan,
neither the Code nor the Treasury Department adequately define the criteria or
provide substantial guidance regarding how they should be administered. GAO
REPORT, supra note 2, at 55; see also Leviner, supra note 24, at 885; Roisman, supra
note 102, at 1018.
109. See Memorandum of Understanding Among the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the
Department
of
Justice
(August
11,
2000),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/mou.htm
(secretaries agreeing to "promote
enhanced compliance with the Fair Housing Act for the benefit of low-income
housing tax credit properties and the general public").
110. See Leviner, supra note 24, at 884.
111. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., UPDATING THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
(LIHTC) DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED IN SERVICE THROUGH 2000 29-30 (2002)
[hereinafter APT 2000 REPORT].

112. Id. at 32-33. Among rental units nationally, 48.2% are located in central
cities, 38% are in suburbs, and 13.8% are in non-metro areas. Id. at 23.
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of households would qualify to live in a tax credit unit, i.e. poor
neighborhoods. ' 13 More than half (54%) of all tax credit units are
located in the central cities, while only 26% are located in the
suburbs, meaning that LIHTC units are also more likely than
11 4
other types of rental housing to be located in the central cities.
More than 73.9% of qualifying units in the central cities are
located in areas with more than 50% low-income households. 115 In
comparison to central-city housing, areas with LIHTC units in the
suburbs contain a lower percentage of poor households, although
even in the suburbs, 48% of the units are in areas where over 50%
of the households qualify as low-income. 116 However, while 32% of
all LIHTC units in the central cities are in neighborhoods with
concentrated poverty, the corresponding proportion of suburban
LIHTC units is only 5.2%. 117 The statistics are evidence that the
LIHTC is promoting high concentrations of poverty in the central
cities.
The statistics dealing with minority concentration in areas
where tax credit units are constructed are also revealing. Though
areas in which LIHTC units are located are not as highly
segregated as those with other forms of federally assisted housing,
LIHTC areas contain a disproportionate number of Blacks and
Latinos when compared with overall averages in areas containing
rental units throughout the country. 118 About 48% of all centralcity units are located in areas with a minority concentration of
more than 50%, while the corresponding number is 20% in the
suburbs and 14.4% in non-metro areas." 9 Overall, around 34% of
all LIHTC units are situated in tracts where minorities comprise
more than 50% of the population.' 2o
In contrast, only
approximately 18% of all tracts at the national level have a similar
characteristic. 121
Thus the LIHTC may also be playing a
significant role in perpetuating segregation in the central-city
areas.
It is possible that state housing agencies are currently trying

113. ABT 2000 REPORT, supra note 111, at 29.
114. Id. at 23.
115. ABT REPORT 1996, supra note 23, at 4-16. Additionally, almost two-thirds
of LIHTC units constructed as family units are placed in neighborhoods with
greater than 10% poverty. KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 103, at 5.
116. ABT REPORT 1996, supra note 23, at 4-16.
117. ABT REPORT 2002, supra note 26, at 36.
118. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 6-8.
119. ABT REPORT 1996, supra note 23, at 4-15.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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to use the LIHTC to promote more mixed-income housing among
certain subsets of potentially eligible households, such as those
with children. For example, the number of family units (units
with more than two bedrooms) in low-poverty 122 metropolitan
areas-meaning both central-city and suburban areas-produced
by the LIHTC program increased steadily between 1995 and 2001,
reaching 35,000 units in 2001.123 The percentage of all LIHTC
units that these family units represented steadily increased in this
time period and reached 39% of all LIHTC units in 2001.124
Moreover, these low poverty areas with LIHTC family housing
were not areas of high minority concentration and were primarily
located in the suburbs. 125 Though conscious policy choices by state
allocating agencies is among the possible reasons for the upward
trend during the time period, it is also possible that these units
are simply being occupied by households without children and
with incomes close to the LIHTC income limits. It is impossible to
tell without more information who actually lives in these LIHTC
units.
In summary, tax credit units are more likely to be located in
areas with a greater incidence of poverty and higher concentration
of minorities. Although some evidence hints that state housing
agencies may be trying to use the tax credit to promote mixedincome housing in areas of low minority concentration among
certain low-income households, the emphasis on credit allocations
to units built in qualified census tracts and the larger body of
statistics suggests that the LIHTC perpetuates poverty and
segregation.
IV. Recommendations to Target Lowest-Income Households
and Ensure the LIHTC Does Not Promote
Concentrations of Poverty and Segregation
If the low-income housing tax credit continues to be the de
facto program for the production of affordable housing,
adjustments are necessary to ensure it strives to attain the
housing policy goal of decent housing for all American families
while remaining in compliance with the FHA. Although treating

122. HUD defines a low-poverty neighborhood as a census tract in which fewer
than 10% of the residents live in households with incomes below the poverty line.
See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 103, at 3. Metropolitan census tracts with
poverty rates below 10% are solidly middle class neighborhoods. Id.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 17.

DEFICIENCIESOF THE LIHTC

2006]

the weaknesses of the LIHTC program in a comprehensive fashion
is beyond the scope of this Article, this section offers two
recommendations for improving the problematic areas previously
discussed: (1) targeting the lowest-income households and (2)
enhanced monitoring of the LIHTC's administration to guarantee
compliance with program requirements and to ensure it is not
promoting higher concentrations of poverty and increased
segregation.
A. Targetingthe Lowest-Income Households
One possible remedy to the inability of the LIHTC to target
the lowest-income households is to increase the amount of the
credit for owners of LIHTC properties that rent to households
below 40% of the area median income. 126 This could be done in the
same way that the program encourages investments in qualified
census tracts and difficult development areas by increasing the
properties' eligible basis that qualifies for the tax credit. 127
However, this may not be entirely satisfactory to target
households near the low end of the income spectrum. Evidence
shows that private owners of LIHTC qualifying properties seeking
to increase profit will continue to rent to households with income
levels near the maximum permitted under the LIHTC.128 The
LIHTC, without the provision of other federal subsidies, on its own
may be insufficient to reach the lowest-income renters.
By using a single measure of area median income to
determine maximum rent levels for units receiving the tax credit,
the LIHTC program essentially permits properties in relatively
wealthy areas to qualify for the credit, even though the rents
affordable at the increased rent and income levels may not be
accessible to the lowest-income households. 29 This could be
remedied by determining income limitations through a dual
approach: areas where the median income is above the national
median income would use the national median income to
determine applicable income limitations, while those areas with
median income below the national median income would still
apply the area median income. 130 Since this measure would lower
income and rent limits in affluent areas, it may help assure that
the administration of the LIHTC in a particular area is serving
126. Leviner, supra note 24, at 898.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 898.
Id.
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those families most in need. 13 1
The LIHTC program's use of HAMFI to define area median
income may lead to income limits that push rent levels toward
higher-income households. Although the ability to charge higher
132
levels of rent may make LIHTC projects more financially viable,
this should be weighed against the inability of low-income renters
to afford the resulting higher rents.
B. Compliance and Monitoring
Although the IRC requires that each state submit a QAP
detailing criteria on the basis of which the tax credit will be
allocated, neither the IRC nor Treasury regulations mandate that
any particular criteria be required, and no regulatory body
monitors the program to make sure that the states are following
their QAPs.133 Although this lack of specified criteria may provide
a desirable degree of flexibility that allows states to mold their
programs to unique local conditions, this is a highly volatile
potential source of both race and class discrimination.
One potential remedy is to require that state housing
agencies submit yearly reports addressing if and exactly how the
criteria detailed in their QAPs were met.134 These reports could be

made public (along with the QAPs) to promote the transparency of
the LIHTC program and simultaneously provide a disincentive for
discrimination in its administration.
The weight of evidence seems to suggest that the LIHTC
perpetuates the housing placement of low-income households in
high-poverty areas and race segregation in direct contradiction to
the mandates of the FHA. Current housing policy shaped by
recent research suggests that placing low-income households in
low-poverty areas with a lower concentration of minorities may
have a beneficial impact.135 The administration of the LIHTC
could therefore include measures to promote mixed-income and
mixed-race neighborhoods. This could mean a system of quotas
planned annually by state housing agencies and included in QAPs
136
to promote diversity in residential communities.
131. Cohen, supra note 94, at 561-62.
132. Cummings and DiPasquale, supra note 28, at 280.
133. See COMMITTEE REPORT supra note 35, at 5-6; see also Leviner, supra note
24, at 882 (discussing the Code and the Treasury's lack of enforcement of their
objective of targeting lowest-income households through the LIHTC).
134. Leviner, supra note 24, at 900.
135. See KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 103, at 1.
136. Leviner, supra note 24, at 901.
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Finally, state
agency compliance
with the above
recommendations and any discretion in the administration of the
LIHTC should be monitored by a central and independent body
consisting of members from state housing agencies, federal
administrators of the LIHTC, and non-profit members or
community activists. 37 The reports by state housing agencies
recommended above would be submitted to this body that would
also be responsible for verifying its contents.
Although implementing the above recommendations would
certainly increase the administrative costs of the LIHTC, it would
enhance oversight of the program and ensure that it is achieving
the policy objectives of providing affordable housing that is not
segregated and poverty-stricken-housing that would be in direct
contradiction to federal housing policy. The establishment of the
centralized body would ensure better operation of the LIHTC and
stimulate its improvement.
Conclusion
In a recent declaration of United States housing policy,
Congress emphasized the importance of providing "a decent house
138
and a suitable living environment for every American family."'
This not only underscores the importance of providing safe and
affordable housing to even the lowest-income households, but also
implies that suitable housing may include additional features such
as the absence of segregation and high concentrations of poverty,
the availability of jobs and educational opportunities, and a low
crime rate.
Since the inception of the LIHTC in 1987, the program "has
become the principal mechanism for supporting the production of
new
and
rehabilitated
rental housing
for low-income
households," 139 and now accounts for almost 90% of affordable
housing constructed with the aid of federal funds. 140 With an
average production of almost 90,000 units each year, by 2004 the
total number of LIHTC units produced (1.3 million) was quickly
approaching the number of units produced by all combined public
housing construction subsidized by the federal government and
subject to federal siting requirements over the last sixty plus

137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (declaring Congressional U.S. housing policy goals).
139. ABT 2000 REPORT, supra note 111, at 2.
140. RECAPITALIZATION REPORT, supra note 27, at 3. Note that this figure does
not include the federal commitment for voucher-based housing programs.
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years.141

While this mass production of housing illustrates the
program's potential in stimulating private investment in the
affordable housing market, the inability of the LIHTC to target the
lowest-income households is a glaring deficiency that needs to be
addressed if it is to remain the de facto program for the production
of affordable housing. The dearth of federal housing assistance is
illustrated in a 1996 study by HUD's Office of Policy and
Development and Research which reported that of over fifteen
million families eligible for some form of housing subsidy, only a
142
little over four million received any government assistance.
Furthermore, the data seem to suggest that the LIHTC
program is perpetuating neighborhoods with high concentrations
of poverty and segregation, in direct violation of the FHA. In light
of current housing policy and the research pointing to the
beneficial effects of mixed-income housing, greater oversight and
enhanced transparency of the LIHTC may be desirable measures
to simultaneously achieve these goals and stem the tide of
discriminatory practices.

142. ABT LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 11, at 1.
142. OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV. & RES., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS IN 1993 4 (1997).

